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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over 
this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-
2a-3(2) (g) as this is an appeal from a final judgment and 
order in a domestic relations action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon 
County, State of Utah. 
The case at bar was tried before the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell on the 14th and 15th days of September, 
1989. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision(Addendum 
A) on September 28, 1989. Two motions requesting 
supplemental decisions were filed concerning property and 
support issues which are not material to the current 
appeal. Following the Court's rulings on those motions, 
Defendant/Appellant filed objections to the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. After minor 
modifications, the Court entered its Findings of Fact 
(hereafter "FF"), Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Divorce on January 10, 1990, (Addendum B) . 
Defendant/Appellant filed Notice of Appeal in the present 
case on February 6, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent offers the following statement of 
relevant facts in the present case: 
(a) Akbar Tizpa was born and raised in Iran 
as the only son of wealthy Iranian parents who still 
reside in and are citizens of that country (TT 334-362) . 
(b) Mr. Tizpa was sent to the United States 
in 1969 to obtain a college education; and, after 
spending some time in Los Angeles, he moved to Price, 
Utah to attend the College of Eastern Utah (TT 344-3 62) . 
(c) While attending CEU, Mr. Tizpa met Tauna, 
who was a high school student at that time, and 
subsequently married her on June 29, 1974 (FF 2; RA 144) . 
(d) The couple continued to reside in Utah 
while Mr. Tizpa finished his education. In 1976 he 
relocated the family back to Iran where they lived for 
approximately four years until the Iranian revolution (TT 
344-363). 
(e) Fleeing from the revolution, the family 
came back to Price, Utah at the end of 1979, and Mr. 
Tizpa commenced employment with Utah Power and Light. He 
also opened Akbar's Karate Studio where, as an expert in 
marshal1 arts, he continues to instruct, not only 
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numerous students, but police officers as well. (TT 386, 
433; OTSC 22). His employment has occupied much of his 
time, leaving little time to devote to the children (FF 
6C) . 
(f) Mr. Tizpa stipulated that throughout the 
marriage until January, 1989, Mrs. Tizpa was a "wonderful 
mother" and the primary caretaker of the four children 
born to this marriage. (Stipulated fact TT 119; FF 6B, 
RA 144). 
(g) Mr. Tizpa's testimony at both the Order 
to Show Cause Hearing and the Trial displayed a dramatic 
cultural gender-bias concerning the role of women and the 
husband's right to totally control his family. (OTSC 123-
180; TT 344-428). 
(h) Mrs. Tizpa testified to a married life of 
constant, continual, and complete domination by Mr. Tizpa 
of every aspect of her life and the lives of her children 
(TT 202-212, OTSC 70-79). A domination that was enforced 
by fear and intimidation (TT 336-338). 
(i) Mrs. Tizpa testified that the only 
"acceptable" companions she had were her mother and her 
children and their friends (OTSC 70-76). 
(j) In January, 1989 Mrs. Tizp ntered into 
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a sexual relationship with 16 year old Ryan McGavin, the 
older brother of a friend of the parties' daughter 
Careshmeh. The relationship was short-lived and by the 
time of trial, the relationship had ended (OTSC 3-6, TT 
275-276, 462). 
(k) Mrs. Tizpa admitted herself to the 
Castleview Hospital Stress Unit in mid-January, 1989 for 
a period of five days and then filed for divorce on 
February 15, 1989 (OTSC 3-4). 
(1) In January, 1989, Mr. Tizpa withdrew all 
the substantial joint marital savings accounts and 
removed Mrs. Tizpa's name from all funds (TT 172-173). 
The only funds left available to Mrs. Tizpa consisted of 
comparatively small amounts in the children's savings 
accounts (TT 174). 
(m) The parties were granted an Order to Show 
Cause Hearing for temporary custody and other related 
issues, which was scheduled as a special full-day setting 
before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge. 
The Court received testimony from eight witnesses and, 
after taking the matter under advisement, the Court 
entered an Order dated April 24, 1989, granting temporary 
custody of the three girls to Mrs. Tizpa and granting 
4 
custody of the parties' son to Mr. Tizpa. The Order also 
restrained Mrs. Tizpa from associating with Ryan McGavin 
in the presence of her children (Order RA 84, Addendum 
C). 
(n) On September 14th and 15th, 1989, trial 
was held and Judge Bunnell received the testimony of 
nineteen (19) witnesses and numerous exhibits (TT cover 
and index). The judge entered a Memorandum Decision 
(Addendum A) ; and, after several motions and supplemental 
decisions not relevant to this appeal, the Court entered 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce on January 10, 1990 (Addendum B). 
(o) The Court found that it was in the best 
interests of the children that the three daughters remain 
with Mrs. Tizpa and the parties' son remain with Mr. 
Tizpa. The Court entered specific findings concerning 
many factors which lead to that result (FF 6A-M; RA 144-
149; Addendum B). 
(p) Defendant/Appellant Mr. Tizpa filed Notice 
of the current appeal on February 6, 1990 (Addendum C). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondent contends that the correct standard 
of review in equitable cases is stated in Rule 52(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the line of cases 
decided after the modification of that rule in 1987. That 
standard requires the Appellate Court to weigh the 
sufficiency of the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact in light of the evidence presented at 
trial and to sustain those Findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous. 
Respondent contends that Appellant has failed 
to meet his burden on appeal because: (1) he has not 
marshalled all the evidence in support of the Trial 
Court's Findings, and (2) he has not demonstrated that 
despite that evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
Finally, Respondent contends that the Trial 
Court applied the appropriate standards in evaluating its 
custody award and entered specific Findings of Fact which 
are supported by substantial evidence which is in the 
record and those Findings should not be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
PURSUANT TO THE MODIFICATION OF RULE 52 (a) , UTAH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT 
SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE UNLESS THEY ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
The Trial Court's numerous and express Findings 
of Fact in the case at bar should be reviewed in light 
of the guidelines found in Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a) provides, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
Rule 52: Findings by the Court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried 
upon the facts without a jury..., the 
court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon, and judgment shall 
be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A;...Findings of Fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, 
to the extent that the court adopts 
them, shall be considered as the 
findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence 
or appear in an opinion or memorandum 
of decision filed by the court... 
[Emphasis added by O^der of the Utah 
Supreme Court on Oc* er 30, 1986 and 
became effective on ^ nuary 1, 1987. ] 
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An analysis of the 1987 modification of Rule 
52(a) demonstrates a clear intent to avoid retrying the 
facts of the case at the appellate level. Because this 
is an equitable case, Appellant urges this Court to "make 
its own findings and substitute its judgment for that of 
the Trial Court." (App. Brief p.8). As support for that 
position, Appellant offers Mitchell v. Mitchell. 527 P.2d 
1359 (Utah 1974) and Wiese v. Wiese. 469 P.2d 504 (Utah 
1970) , cases decided many years prior to the modification 
of Rule 52(a). That position is not consistent with 
either Rule 52(a) or the more recent line of cases 
clarifying the standard of appellate review. In Riche v. 
Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989), an equitable case, 
this Court stated: 
Husband, in his brief on appeal, 
refers this court to evidence which 
conflicts with the trial court's 
findings and supports his contention 
that he should have been awarded 
custody of the four children. 
However, Husband does not "marshal 
the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be *against the clear 
weight of the evidence,' thus making 
them *clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 
776 P.2d at 886 (quoting Walker. 743 
P.2d at 193) . See also Scharf v. BMG 
Corp. , 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985); Harker v. Condominiums Forest 
8 
Glen. Inc. . 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) . Therefore, we decline 
to further consider Husband's attack 
on the court's findings as to 
custody. (Riche, supra p. 468). 
In Shioii v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197 (Utah 1985), 
an equitable case, the Supreme Court has also expressly 
provided: 
On appeal from a judgment of the 
Trial Court, our [Appellate Court] 
role is not to substitute our own 
findings for those of the Trial 
Court, but to examine the record for 
evidence supporting the judgment. 
(Shioii, supra, at 201.) 
[Emphasis added] 
Given that express statement of the role of the 
Appellate Court, Appellant is charged with the 
responsibility of (1) marshalling all the evidence in 
support of the findings, and (2) demonstrating that 
despite that evidence, the Trial Court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. 
In the case at bar, Appellant has failed to 
present any of the evidence upon which the judge based 
his very detailed findings. Instead, he has chosen to 
make conclusionary statements, many of which are flagrant 
misrepresentations of the actual testimony, and has 
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further chosen to base those conclusionary statements on 
only his side of the disputed testimony. For example, 
Appellant's Brief states that Mrs. Tizpa charged items 
costing $7,000.00 for Mr. Ryan McGavin, but her testimony 
and documentary evidence showed items costing less than 
$500.00 (TT 164). Appellant's Brief states that Mrs. 
Tizpa took funds totalling about $1,200.00 from the 
children's savings accounts over a period of time but it 
forgets to mention that Mr. Tizpa had withdrawn all 
$8,000.00 from the family savings at UP&L, and the 
$4,500.00 from Desertview and that he closed all other 
joint accounts and left Mrs. Tizpa with none of the 
marital savings, long before she took any money from the 
children's accounts. (TT 172-175). Appellant's Brief 
states that Mrs. Tizpa violated the Court's Temporary 
Order by associating with Mr. McGavin in the children's 
presence but it fails to demonstrate any intentional 
violation on her part and it ignores Mrs. Tizpa's 
testimony to the contrary (TT 275-276). Finally 
Appellant's Brief repeatedly relies on Dr. Smith's home-
study but fails to "marshall the evidence" which showed 
why the Trial Court lacked confidence in the report, 
namely, Dr. Smith had become personally involved with Mr. 
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Tizpa, failed to evaluate evidence favorable to Mrs. 
Tizpa's position (TT 291-305) and, according to Mrs. 
Tryfonas (TT 81-84) and Misty Matthews (TT 122-125), 
misrepresented their interviews in his report. 
Appellant's burden requires that he marshall, 
not ignore, the evidence which supports the Trial Court's 
ruling but, in the case at bar, Appellant has presented 
only his side of the disputed testimony. 
Since Appellant has not met his burden for 
appellate review, Respondent urges this Court to renew 
its position as stated in Riche, supra, and decline to 
further consider Appellant's attack on the Trial Court's 
Findings with respect to custody. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS IN 
EVALUATING ITS CUSTODY AWARD AND ENTERED SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS THEY ARE 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS 
Section 30-3-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended 1988, provides: 
(1) If a husband and wife having 
minor children are separated, or 
their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an 
order for the future care and custody 
of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, 
the court shall consider the best 
interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties. The 
court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the 
children's desires regarding the 
future custody, but the expressed 
desires are not controlling and the 
court may determine the children's 
custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court 
shall consider, among other factors 
the court finds relevant, which 
parent is most likely to act in the 
best interests of the child, 
including allowing the child frequent 
and continuing contact with the 
noncustodial parent as the court 
finds appropriate. 
Said section requires the Trial Court to apply 
the "best interests of the child" test. Although no 
specific list of factors defining the best interests test 
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can be applied to all cases, the courts have provided 
direction with respect to a number of significant factors 
which should be considered by the Trial Court. Smith v. 
Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986). In Pusev v. Pusev. 728 
P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court identified 
four factors: the identity of the primary caretaker, the 
parent with greater flexibility to provide personal care 
for the child, the parent with whom the child has spent 
significant time pending custody determination, and the 
stability of environment of each parent. Additional 
factors include: the parent who provides a moral 
environment more conducive to the child's needs. Shioii 
v. Shioii, supra; and Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623 
(Utah 1987); the needs of the children and which parent 
best meets those needs, Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 
994 (Utah 1986); the emotional stability of the parents, 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982), and 
Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1987); the 
wisdom of dividing the children's custody or preserving 
the children together as a family unit, Joraenson v. 
Joraenson, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979) and Pusey v. Pusey, 
supra. 
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In the case at bar, a review of the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact and Memorandum Decision 
demonstrates the application of these factors by the 
court in arriving at its determination of a result which 
would be in the best interests of each of the minor 
children. The Court did not lump the children together 
as though they were some indistinguishable mass, but 
rather evaluated each child's needs individually to 
determine what was in the best interest of each child. 
That approach was consistent with the testimony of 
Plaintiff's witnesses who described the unique abilities, 
deficiencies and needs of each child. It would have been 
a grave injustice to the children to assume that two 
year old Azita's best interests would be identical to 
those of seven year old Camellia, who has several 
learning disabilities, or to those of the intensely proud 
and independent twelve year old Omeid. Additionally, it 
would have been an equally grave injustice to assume that 
the best interests of the three (3) daughters would be 
the same as those of the son, given the cultural and 
psychological differences between their mother and 
father, which will be discussed at length later in this 
brief. 
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The Trial Court expressly acknowleuged, in 
paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact, as follows: 
The Court is familiar with the 
relevant case law and particularly 
the best interests test as defined 
in Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 
1986). The Court is also mindful of 
the numerous other cases which 
outline additional factors which the 
court must take into consideration 
in determining what is in the best 
interests of the minor children. 
(FF6, RA 145, Addendum B). 
After stressing the difficult nature of this 
custody determination and the need to protect the best 
interests of each of the children (FF6, RA 144, Addendum 
B) , the Court then went on to enter express findings 
addressing each of the major relevant factors: 
A. That both parents have the 
necessary skills to take care of the 
daily physical needs of the children 
and that neither parent has abused 
or significantly neglected the 
children in the past. 
B. The Court finds that the 
Plaintiff has been the primary 
caretaker of the children since their 
respective births until the time of 
the separation of the parties in 
approximately February of 1988. 
Plaintiff has continued to be the 
primary caretaker of the three (3) 
minor daughters of the parties since 
the time of the separation of the 
parties. The Court further finds that 
the parties' son, Omeid, has been in 
the care and custody of the Defendant 
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for a time period following shortly 
after the separation of the parties 
in February of 1988. 
C. The Court finds that during the 
course of this marriage and up to the 
present time, the Defendant has 
maintained full time employment with 
Utah Power and Light and also runs 
and operates a Karate school and 
studio on a part time basis and that 
he has had little time to devote to 
the every day care and supervision 
of the children. The Court finds that 
the Plaintiff has not worked during 
this marriage but has devoted her 
full time to the care and supervision 
of the children, except that she has 
recently started a part time job that 
takes her out of the home for 
approximately 20 hours a week. 
D. The Court finds that each of 
these children has specialized needs 
which need to be addressed by the 
Court in arriving at the Court's 
decision on custody. 
E. The youngest child, Azita, age 
2, has never had another caretaker 
except her mother and the Court finds 
that there is a strong bond of love 
and affection between the Plaintiff 
and this youngest child. When the 
Plaintiff is working her few hours 
each week, the Plaintiff's mother has 
been providing care for the child and 
that arrangement is working 
satisfactorily. The Court finds that 
it is in Azita's best interest not 
to disrupt that strong bond of love 
and affection with the Plaintiff. 
F. The Court finds that Camellia, 
age 7, has several learning 
disabilities and is enrolled in a 
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special education course that 
requires extra help and supervision 
outside of school and that the 
Plaintiff has been supplying that 
extra help and supervision. This 
child is making excellent progress 
in her schooling and training but 
will need continued special help for 
several hours a day if her progress 
is to continue. The Plaintiff has 
been supplying this help and is in 
a position to continue devoting the 
time necessary to assist Camellia in 
her future studies. 
G. Omeid, the son of these parties, 
nearly age 12, has developed a great 
amount of animosity toward his mother 
because of her prior activity and 
expresses a strong desire to remain 
with his father where he has been 
since the temporary order was issued 
in April of 1989. Omeid is 
progressing well in his schooling, 
shows no signs of personal or social 
maladjustment, and seems to be happy 
living with his father. Because of 
the strong animosity that he has 
developed against his mother, it 
would not be in his best interest to 
force him to live with her at this 
time. The Court finds that it is in 
Omeid's best interests that he be 
allowed to remain with his father. 
H. The parties oldest daughter, 
Careshmeh, age 14 plus, has expressed 
a strong and determined desire to 
live with her mother and is very 
emphatic in opposition to living with 
her father. The Court finds that she 
is well-adjusted socially, is 
receiving high grades in her 
schooling, is active in various 
school and church activities and is 
happy living with her mother. The 
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Court finds that it would not be in 
Careshmeh's best interests to force 
her to live with her father at this 
time. 
I. The Court finds that if the 
Defendant was given custody of the 
two (2) younger children, he would 
have to employ a daycare provider for 
substantial periods of time and 
either spend special time with 
Camellia or employ a tutor for her. 
The activities required by the tutor 
and a daycare provider are presently 
being adequately provided for by the 
Plaintiff. The Court finds that the 
Plaintiff's schedule is the more 
flexible one in meeting the needs of 
these two (2) younger children and 
particularly the special needs of the 
minor child, Camellia. 
J. The Court particularly finds 
that it would certainly be a 
detriment to the two (2) younger 
children to remove them from the care 
and custody of their mother. 
K. The Court finds that there is 
no doubt that the Plaintiff has shown 
very poor judgment in her 
relationship with a sixteen (16) year 
old boy named Ryan McGavin. Her 
indiscretions in this regard cannot 
be tolerated and, if they were to 
continue, could have a detrimental 
affect on the children. These past 
activities have not had a 
demonstrable effect on the children, 
except for the boy, Omeid. Although 
there seems to be some factual 
dispute about the matters contained 
in the family study performed by Dr. 
Smith, the doctor's final 
recommendation to the Court is 
primarily based on the general 
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unwholesome character of Mr. McGavin, 
and the Plaintiffs continued 
association with him. There is no 
doubt that Plaintiff's association 
with Mr. McGavin has caused 
considerable embarrassment to all of 
the family in the community in the 
past. Dr. Smith also testified that 
with respect to the two (2) younger 
children of the parties, they were 
of such a young age that they had no 
appreciable understanding of that 
relationship and therefore had not 
been detrimentally effected by same. 
The Plaintiff testified that she has 
had little association with Mr. 
McGavin since the temporary order was 
entered and that if given custody of 
the children, she would have no 
association with him in the future. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it 
is in the best interests of the 
children that the present custodial 
arrangement be continued and that the 
Plaintiff be awarded the custody and 
control of the three (3) girls and 
that the Defendant be awarded the 
custody of the parties' son. 
L. The Court further finds that the 
visitation schedule that has been set 
up in the temporary order has been 
working effectively between the 
parties and that it is in the best 
interests of the minor children that 
said visitation order become the 
permanent order of visitation in the 
final Decree of Divorce. 
M. In the best interests of the 
children, the Court finds that the 
Plaintiff should be ordered not to 
associate with Ryan McGavin at any 
time. 
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The evidence at trial supported each of the 
Findings and a sampling of that support is offered as 
follows: 
Finding 6A. Each side presented evidence of 
his or her ability to cook, clean and otherwise provide 
for the children's physical needs. Despite Mr. Tizpa7s 
allegations that the children had been left alone or 
unsupervised (App. Brief p. 20) , the Trial Court expressly 
found that neither parent had abused or significantly 
neglected the children. Perhaps the Court was persuaded 
by the testimony of Social Worker Olivia Sherman, who 
admitted that all her referrals against Mrs. Tizpa were 
prompted by "persons involved in this suit" (TT 259) and 
that after her investigation, she terminated the 
department's involvement "without action" (TT 258) . 
Perhaps the Court was persuaded by the stipulated fact 
that for fifteen years Mrs. Tizpa was not only a good 
mother but was "a wonderful mother and the primary 
caretaker of the children." (TT 119). Perhaps the Court 
was persuaded that Mr. Tizpa was relying on a few 
isolated incident's which occurred during a three (3) 
month period from January to April 1989 for which Mrs. 
Tizpa had explanations. Whatever the Judge's reasons for 
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believing one witness or discounting another, that was 
his prerogative and his decision should be given great 
deference. Shioii, supra; Riche, supra. 
Finding 6B. The Court's finding that Mrs. Tizpa 
had been the primary caretaker of the children was a 
stipulated fact. (TT 119). It was also undisputed that 
she continued to be the primary caretaker of the parties' 
three (3) daughters during the nine (9) months following 
the parties7 separation. 
Finding 6C. In Finding 6C the Court evaluated 
the past and present schedules of the parties for 
purposes of determining their respective flexibility in 
meeting the children's needs. Such an evaluation is in 
conformity with Pusey, supra, and the evidence in support 
of the finding was undisputed. 
Finding 6D. The Court found that the children 
had different needs which the Court had to address. A 
review of the testimony of Camellia's teacher, Allan 
Patterson, concerning her learning disabilities, (TT 103-
110) or Careshmeh's principal, Tina Crookston describing 
her exceptional abilities (TT 137-147) offers strong 
support for the finding as does the obvious range in ages 
21 
of the children from Azita at age two to Careshmeh at age 
fifteen (FF 3). 
Finding 6E. Concerning two year old Azita, the 
Court found a strong bond of love and affection between 
Mrs. Tizpa and this child. The Court also found that the 
child had never had another primary caretaker and that 
it was not in Azita's best interests to disrupt that 
strong bond. The finding is amply supported by testimony 
from not only Mrs. Tizpa, but Careshmeh (TT 20-21) , Larae 
Tryfonas (TT 73-74) and Misty Matthews (TT 126-127), and 
many other witnesses to numerous to mention, who 
described the relationship between Mrs. Tizpa and Azita, 
and Mr. Tizpa's past unwillingness to be involved in 
providing daily care for the child. 
Finding 6F. With respect to Camellia, age 
seven, the Court found that the child has several 
learning disabilities and that Mrs. Tizpa has always 
helped and supported her and, as a result, the child is 
doing very well in school and in social settings. By 
comparison, the Court received considerable testimony 
that Mr. Tizpa was a harsh disciplinarian, was impatient 
with imperfection, and had great difficulty tolerating 
Camellia's disabilities (TT 21-23, 216-217). A review of 
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the testimony of Mr. Patterson (TT 103-109), strongly 
supports the finding. He described the type of parenting 
skills that work with children like Camellia and those 
that are "disastrous". (TT 109). The disastrous 
personality traits included expectations which exceeded 
the child's ability (TT 109), lack of patience (TT 108), 
and harsh or severe disciplinary techniques (TT 107-108) . 
From that testimony, as well as the numerous descriptions 
of Mr. Tizpa's personality, and the Judge's ability to 
observe Mr. Tizpa's demeanor in the courtroom, it is 
reasonable to assume that Mrs. Tizpa was the only 
potential custodian for Camellia. In fact in Finding 6J, 
the Court expressly found it would be a detriment to the 
two younger children to remove them from their mother's 
care, and Mr. Patterson's testimony lends a great deal 
of support to that position. 
Finding 6G and 6H. Next the Court faced the 
extremely difficult task of determining custody of the 
two older children Careshmeh, age fifteen, and Omeid, age 
twelve. A review of each child's testimony in chambers 
will indicate just how strongly each one felt about their 
respective custodians. Contrary to Appellant's attempts 
to label Careshmeh as a lying, immature child (App. Brief 
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p. 15) , the majority of the witnesses described both 
Careshmeh and Omeid as very bright, talented, articulate, 
super-achievers with a list of accomplishments that would 
make most adults envious. In analyzing the feelings of 
these children, the Judge wisely perceived that it would 
be unhealthy, and possibly even dangerous, to try and 
force them to live with the alternative parent. Please 
note the findings expressly state "forced". (FF6 G and 
H) . The Judge then examined the current living 
arrangements of each and found that they were both doing 
very well. In spite of Mr. Tizpa's allegations, the 
testimony of Tina Crookston, Careshmeh7s principal, 
demonstrated that there had been little, if any, negative 
impact on Careshmeh, and that the child continued to 
excel both academically and socially (TT 137-147) . After 
hearing all the testimony and having the benefit of not 
only hearing the children's words, but observing the 
strength of their feelings, the Trial Judge found it was 
not in their best interests to force them to alter their 
chosen environments and those findings should be accorded 
great deference. Riche, supra; Shioii, supra. 
Finding 6K. The Court received substantial 
testimony concerning Mrs. Tizpa's relationship with Ryan 
24 
McGavin and the effect, or lack thereof, upon the 
children. With respect to the two younger children, the 
Court found that the relationship had no detrimental 
effect as they had no understanding or comprehension of 
it. That finding is supported by Dr. Smith's testimony 
during cross-examination (TT 298-299). The testimony 
disclosed varying effects on the two older children; it 
also disclosed the effects each child was experiencing 
as a result of their father's reaction to the 
relationship. In the Order on Order to Show Cause 
(Addendum C) , the Court found that Omeid's attitude 
toward his mother was being "nurtured" by the statements 
and actions of his father. (Order, April 24, 1989, page 
2, Addendum C) . It is arguable whether Mrs. Tizpa's 
relationship affected the older children or whether Mr. 
Tizpa's statements and actions about it to the children 
created the greater damage. Either way, it polarized them 
to a point that neither of them would have benefited from 
a change in the custodial relationship (FF6G and H) . Mrs. 
Tizpa testified at trial that she had had little contact 
with Ryan since the Order to Show Cause Hearing in April, 
1989, none of which was in the children's presence, and 
that they had gone their separate ways (TT 275-276) . She 
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advised the Court that she would willingly agree to an 
order that she have no contact with him (TT 326). Under 
subpoena by Appellant, Ryan McGavin told the court the 
same thing (TT 462)• Appellant contends that the Trial 
Court should have removed the girls because of the 
mother's indiscretion. Who would that have punished—the 
mother or the girls! The Court weighed the best interests 
of these children and the effect of Mrs. Tizpa's conduct 
on them and expressly found it to be in the best 
interests of the three daughters to remain with Mrs. 
Tizpa. 
Finally, in the Findings, the Trial Court side-
stepped a major issue that permeated the entire trial and 
which lends strong support to the Findings of Fact and 
the ultimate decision of the Court: Appellant's cultural 
background has created a strong gender-bias that is not 
consistent with the girls' best interests, particularly 
if their mother's mitigating influence is removed from 
the home. 
Mrs. Tizpa testified to a life of consistent, 
continual, complete domination from the time of her 
marriage to the date of separation (TT 202-212; OTSC T 
70-76). That domination is consistent with Mr. Tizpa's 
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Iranian background which gives the husband total control 
over his wife and children (OTSC 32-37). Every aspect of 
Mrs. Tizpa's life, and the life of the children, was 
dictated by Mr. Tizpa and enforced by fear and 
intimidation. Mrs. Tizpa's testimony was supported by 
Careshmeh and Mrs. Connie Kennick who described the 
heartrending incident when the child was forced to give 
up her dancing because Mr. Tizpa objected to the dance 
outfits after age twelve. (TT 209-211, TT 154). When 
Careshmeh was elected cheerleader by her classmates, Mr. 
Tizpa forbid her to be a cheerleader and told her, in 
front of the other children, that cheerleaders were sluts 
and prostitutes (TT 27, OTSC 66-67) . At the Order to Show 
Cause hearing, psychologist Delvin McFarland, one of 
Appellant's witnesses, testified to the cultural 
differences he perceived which required that Mr. Tizpa 
be honored, respected and in charge of all aspects of his 
family's life (OTSC 32-37). Mrs. Tizpa testified about 
the husband's right to kill a wife in Iran and being 
constantly told "that she came into the marriage in her 
wedding dress and she would leave it in her wedding 
dress", a reference to the fact that Iranian women are 
buried in their wedding dresses (TT 336-338). Detective 
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Sergeant Milburn testified about Mr. Tizpa's proficiency 
as an instructor in marshal arts and admitted that he 
could not defend himself if confronted by Mr. Tizpa. Mrs. 
Tizpa advised the Court that the only "acceptable" 
companions she ever had were her mother and the children 
and friends of the children (OTSC 70-76), which gives 
some insight into her relationship with a 16 years old. 
She further testified that she was not allowed to go with 
her lady friends to lunch or shopping because some of 
those ladies might smoke or take a drink (OTSC 76) . After 
all, according to Mr. Tizpa, Mrs. Tizpa's place was with 
the family in the home (OTSC p. 176 line 1 and 2); she 
was to dress appropriately according to his standards 
(OTSC 176) , and "something must have been wrong with her 
if she was out at 10:00 p.m. at night" (OTSC 176). The 
Court might find Mr. Tizpa's methods of "disciplining" 
his wife rather interesting. When she came home one night 
at 11:30 p.m., his testimony provides (TT 137): 
She was with my daughter, of course. 
And she stood and told me very 
boldly, "I was out." I got mad at 
her. I strike her. I moved her head 
with my hand, and I kicked her in the 
butt. You understand, I did not — 
I did not hit her [so] hard that she 
could not function. If I kick hard, 
she would not be able to be here now. 
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Mr. Tizpa's attitude was further demonstrated when he 
instructed Mrs. Tizpa's counsel, a woman, to address him 
as Mr. Tizpa, in a tone that could only be appreciated 
by those in the courtroom (TT 169) . The record is filled 
with support for Mrs. Tizpa's descriptions of her life. 
LaRae Tryfonas, Tauna's mother, described the 
years of domination and fear (TT 67-86). Peggy Farlaino 
(TT 115-118) described the extreme restrictions placed 
on her relationship with Mrs. Tizpa because of Mr. 
Tizpa's expectations and of the attempted intimidation 
by Mr. Tizpa that hung over the trial like a black cloud 
(TT 119). In fact, aside from the appraisers, about the 
only witnesses who had not noticed the gender-bias were 
Mr. Tizpa's family and friends who were also raised in 
Iran. 
Since the Findings of Fact are amply supported 
by the record and since the inherent cultural gender-bias 
displayed by Mr. Tizpa was not in the best interests of 
the minor daughters, the Trial Court's decision is not 
clearly erroneous and should therefore be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, Appellant has failed to meet his 
burden on appeal because: (1) he has not marshalled all 
the evidence in support of the Trial Court's Findings, 
and (2) he has not demonstrated that despite that 
evidence, the Trial Court's Findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence• Because of that failure, Respondent urges this 
Court to review its position as stated in Riche, supra, 
and decline to further consider Appellant's attack on the 
Trial Court's Findings on custody. 
Additionally, since the Findings of Fact are 
amply supported by the record and since the inherent 
cultural gender-bias displayed by Mr. Tizpa was not in 
the best interests of the parties' minor daughters, the 
Trial Court's decision is not clearly erroneous and 
should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 6th day of July, 
1990. 
JOKNE PAPPAS WHITE 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Memorandum Decision 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TAUNA LEE TIZPA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
AKBAR TIZPA, 
Defendant. ] 
i MEMORANDUM DECISION 
i C i v i l No. 15776 
This matter came on regularly for trial before the 
Court on the 14th day of September, 1989, and the Court heard 
testimony and received exhibits for and on behalf of each of 
the parties, and took this matter under advisement and rules 
as hereinafter stated. 
The Court finds that irreconcilable differences have 
developed between these parties and the Court therefore grants 
a divorce in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
and in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. 
The Court must first determine the question of 
custody of the children since the balance of the distribution 
of property, and other matters, depend a good bit on what 
disposition is made in that regard. 
Because of the conflict in the evidence and testimony 
as presented by each side, the Court finds it extremely 
this particular case. The Court must, of necessity, make its 
decision based upon a determination of what is in the best 
interest of those children. The Court finds that both parents 
have the necessary skills to take care of the daily needs of 
the children, and that neither has abused or significantly 
neglected the children in the past. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff has been the 
primary caretaker of the children since their birth, and up to 
the time of the separation of the parties in approximately 
February of 1988, she has continued to be the primary caretaker 
except for their son, Omeid, who has been in the custody of the 
defendant. 
During the course of this marriage and up to the 
present time, the defendant has maintained full employment and 
runs and operates a karate school and studio on a part time 
basis, and has had little time to devote to the everyday care 
and supervision of the children. The plaintiff has not worked 
and has devoted her fulltime to the care and supervision of the 
children except that she now has a small part time job that 
takes her out of the home for approximately 20 hours a week. 
The youngest child, age two, has never had another 
caretaker except her mother and there is a strong bond of 
affection between the plaintiff and this youngest child. When 
the plaintiff is working her few hours each week, the grand-
mother of the child, the plaintiff's mother, has been the 
primary caretaker for the child during this period of time. 
Camellia, age seven, has a learning disablity and is 
enrolled in a special education course that requires extra help 
and supervision outside of school that the plaintiff has been 
supplying. This child is making excellent progress in her 
schooling and training and will need continued special help for 
several hours each day if her progress is to continue. The 
plaintiff has been supplying this help and is in a position to 
continue devoting the time necessary to assist the girl in her 
future studies. 
The son of the parties, age nearly twelve, has 
developed a great amount of animosity toward his mother because 
of her prior activities and expresses a strong desire to remain 
with his father where he has been since the temporary order was 
issued in April of 1989. The boy is progressing well in his 
school, shows no signs of personal or social maladjustment, and 
seems to be happy living with his father. Because of the 
strong animosity that he has developed against his mother, it 
would not be in his best interest to force him to live with her 
at this time. 
The oldest daughter, Careshmeh, age fourteen plus, 
"
as expressed a strong and determined desire to live with her 
mother and is very emphatic in opposition to living with her 
father, she is well adjusted socially, is receiving high 
9rades in her schooling, is active in various school and church 
activities and is happy living with her mother. 
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The defendant, if given custody of the two younger 
childrenf would have to employ a day care provider and either 
spend special time with Camellia or employ a tutor for her. 
The activities required by the tutor are presently being 
adequately provided by her mother. 
The Court feels that it would certainly be a 
detriment to the two younger children to remove them from the 
custody and care of their mother. 
There is no doubt that the plaintiff has shown very 
poor judgment in her relationship with a 16 year old boy by the 
i 
name of Ryan McGavin. Her indiscretions in this regard cannot 
be tolerated, and if they are to continue it could have a 
detrimental effect on the children. These past activities have 
not had a demonstrable effect on the children except for the 
boy# Omeid, which the Court has already mentioned. Although 
there seems to be some factual dispute about the matters 
contained in the family study performed by Dr. Smith and 
reported to the Court, the Doctor's final recommendation to the 
Court is primarily based upon the general unwholesome character 
of Mr. McGavin, and the plaintiff1s continued association with 
him. There is no doubt that her association with McGavin has 
caused considerable embarrassment to all of the family in the 
community in the past. 
However# the plaintiff testified that she has had 
little association with Mr. McGavin since the Temporary Order 
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was entered, and that, if given custody of the children, she 
would have no association with him in the future. 
Therefore, the Court finds that it is in the best 
interest of the children that the present custodial arrangement 
continue. That the plaintiff be awarded custody and control of 
the three girls, and that the defendant be awarded the custody 
of their son. The Court orders that the Decree provide for 
custody accordingly. 
The Court further orders that the visitation order 
as contained and set up in the Temporary Order become the 
permanent order of visitation in the final Decree. 
The Court further orders that the plaintiff not 
associate with Ryan McGavin at any time. 
The Court finds that the defendant has a gross 
income from his employment of approximately $4,170.00 per 
month, and that the plaintiff has a gross income from her 
employment of approximately $344.00 per month. 
Although the parties have some income from their 
rental property, the Financial Statement as submitted by the 
defendant shows that there is a negative cash-flow on this 
Property after payment of the mortgage payments and that they 
have had to supplement this income in order to make the 
Payments on the property. The record further shows that the 
defendant received for the first eight months of 1989 a net 
•^ncome from his karate business in the approximate sum of 
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$3/000.00 when we subtract the depreciation that he contained 
in his schedule. This schedule also shows that there may be 
some duplication of personal expenses that he has charged 
against this business account. 
The net amount received from the karate studio has 
been and will be required to make up the negative cash-flow on 
the rental property, and so the Court cannot take this amount 
into account in fixing child support and alimony. 
Based upon the Child Support Guideline Worksheets 
and the Financial Statements of the parties, the Court finds 
that the defendant can reasonably pay, and that the plaintiff 
will need the sum of $266.00 per month for each of the children 
in her custody. The Court will not order that the plaintiff 
pay to the defendant any sum to contribute to the support of 
their son because of her extremely limited income. 
The income statement of the defendant shows that he 
has a monthly deduction of $333.00 per month to a savings 
account, and pays life insurance premiums in the amount of 
$116.00 per month. Although the Court feels that these 
deductions are admirable, they should not continue if those 
funds are needed for family necessities. The defendant's 
Financial Statement farther shows that he pays $325.00 per 
month for rent, and the evidence shows that he is living in one 
°f their own apartments. 
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The plaintiff's Financial Statement lists net income 
of $289.00 a month, and expenses of $2,117.00. Her biggest 
expense is for debt payments of $548.00 a month on charge 
accounts that carry a high interest rate. The plaintiff 
should, and can, make arrangements for reduction of this 
expense by application of other assets or by making other 
arrangements for the payment of those debts. 
Based upon the relative incomes, the length of 
marriage, the ability to pay, and the needs of the parties, the 
Court has concluded that the defendant can pay, and the 
plaintiff will reasonably need the sum of $600.00 per month by 
way of alimony. 
The payment of support and alimony shall commence 
with the month of October, 1989, and shall be payable one half 
on or before October 15, 1989, and one half on or before the 
last day of the last day of October, 1989, and continuing 
monthly thereafter. The Court further orders that the 
Temporary Order in affect shall continue through the month of 
September, 1989. 
The Court orders that the home of the parties, 
together with the adjacent lot, L>e placed in the names of the 
parties as tenants in common, and that the plaintiff shall have 
the right to the use of the property for herself and the three 
children until such time as she vacates the property, 
remarries, or the youngest child reaches 18 years of age, at 
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which time the property will be sold and the net equity 
received from the sale shall be divided equally between the 
parties. 
Until that property is sold, the plaintiff shall pay 
the taxes and insurance on the property, and shall be 
responsible to take care of necessary repairs and maintenance 
to keep the property in a reasonable state suitable for 
habitation. 
The Court further orders that all other real 
property be held in the name of the parties as tenants in 
common, and that it be listed for sale, and that upon sale the 
net proceeds thereof be divided between the parties. Until the 
property is sold, the defendant shall be entitled to all income 
from the property and shall be obligated to pay all mortage 
payments, taxes and insurance, and upkeep on the property. In 
the event the defendant wishes to keep the karate studio, he 
may do so by paying to the plaintiff one half of the current 
appraised value as determined by two appraisers, one to be 
chosen by each of the parties. 
There is a conflict of testimony regarding an 
alledged debt owed to defendant's father. Since t'rere is no 
written evidence of the debt, no schedule of payments/ no due 
date established, and no recorded security instruments, the 
Court orders that each party will be responsible to pay one 
half of any debt owed to the plaintiff's father if that debt is 
established as a legal obligation. 
The Court orders that the plaintiff receive one half 
of the defendant's unincumbered stock in his Utah Power and 
Light Employee's Savings and Stock Purchase Plan of Pacificorp 
and she shall be responsible to pay any tax on her share of 
that stock when it is withdrawn and delivered to her* 
The defendant shall be entitled to the balance of 
the stock and savings plans and he will be ordered to assume 
and pay the loan on the encumbered portion of that stock that 
he is to receive. 
The Court further orders that all of the children's 
savings accounts go to the party who has custody of that child 
for the use and benefit of the child. 
The Court further orders that the IRA account in the 
Deseret View Credit Union be awarded to the plaintiff, and that 
the IRA account in All State be awarded to the defendant. 
The Court further orders that the policies of 
insurance on each of the children are to be awarded to the 
party who has that child in his or her custody and if the party 
wishes to continue the policy, the custodial parent will be 
responsible to pay for any premiums on the policy. 
The Court awards to the plaintiff the 1986 Jeep, the 
1980 Buick, and the 1978 Dodge van. The defendant is awarded 
the 1979 Mercedes, the 1979 Ford truck, 1981 Yamaha, and the 
1983 3-Wheeler. 
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The Court awards to the plaintiff the furniture, 
fixtures and contents of the home of the parties, except the 
following items are awarded to the defendant: 
All of his personal items, and all of the furniture 
and fixtures in the home that were exclusively used by Omeid, 
together with all of Omeid1s personal effects including the 
Nintendo, All of his office furniture equipment, his tools, 
the stereo, the Epson computer, the non-remote TV, the camera 
and projector, the family room set with the fold out queen size 
bed and loveseat. 
The defendant is further awarded all of his personal 
effects and one-third of all the bedding, linens, towels, 
cooking utensils, and cooking hardware, so as to allow him to 
set up housekeeping for himself and his son. 
The Court awards to the defendant the shotgun, the 
357 Mangum, and two .22 Rifles, and awards to the plaintiff the 
30 06 Rifle and the .22 pistol. 
The Court awards to the defendant the red and blue 
13 x 9 carpet and on red and blue 21 x 31 carpet. The Court 
awards to the plaintiff two red carpets, each 3' x 61, one red 
and blue carpet, 31 x 61, and one red carpet 2% x 5'. 
The Court awards all of the jewelry to the plaintiff 
that she now "has in her possession except for the gold lion 
rin9 that is awarded to the defendant. 
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The Court awards to the defendant the jewelry that 
^e now has in his possession except the wedding ring and band, 
and the engagement ring and the one-third carat diamond ring. 
The Court further orders that the plaintiff will pay 
and assume the debts listed on her financial statement, and the 
defendant will assume and pay all other debts not specifically 
provided for in this decision. 
The Court further orders that in the event the 
defendant is entitled to retirement benefits not covered by his 
stock purchase plan, that the plaintiff shall be entitled to 
one-half of said benefits that were accumulated during the 
period of this marriage, and the Court further directs that the 
parties enter into a qualified domestic relations division of 
that retirement if it exists. 
The Court further orders that the defendant assist 
the plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and benefits 
if the plaintiff desires those benefits and provided that she 
pay the necessary payment that would be required to obtain them. 
The Court further orders that the plaintiff sign 
such documents as may be necessary to allow the defendant to 
claim the three children in her custody as dependents on his 
income tax, and that he be allowed to continue this claimed 
deduction until such time as the plaintiff may obtain fulltime 
employment. In the event she does obtain fulltime employment, 
the Court directs that the plaintiff shall be allowed to claim 
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the two youngest children as dependents on her income tax 
return and the defendant shall be allowed to claim the two 
oldest children as dependents on his income tax. In the event 
that the plaintiff is not willing to sign the necessary 
documents as indicated herein, the Court will, upon petition of 
the defendant, reconsider the amount of alimony that the Court 
has ordered him to pay under this decision. 
The Court further orders that the parties divide any 
funds that may be available to them under the defendant's 
insurance plan to pay for attorney's fees, and that each of the 
parties assume and pay all of the balance of their attorney 
fees and costs. 
The Court directs that the attorney for the 
plaintiff prepare the necessary Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Decree in accordance with this Memorandum Decision. 
DATED this .^yj^day of September, 1989. 
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of Law and Decree of Divorce 
ORIGINAL 
i i:... J 
I 'M I I •»*>« 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 ^ ^ 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f BY <y ^k'fffffi'ftgg^. 
Fi f th S t r e e t Plaza, S u i t e 1 -t.-^.f ^ 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAUNA LEE TIZPA, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Vs. ; 
AKBAR TIZPA, 
Defendant. 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I Civil No. 15776 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial before the Court on the 14th and 15th days of September, 
1989, the Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge, presiding; 
and the Plaintiff having appeared personally and with her 
counsel, JOANE PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant having 
appeared personally and with his counsel, SHARON DONOVAN; and, 
the Court having heard sworn testimony and having received 
exhibits for and on behalf of each of the parties and having 
taken this matter under advisement now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the parties hereto are actual and bona 
fide residents of Carbon County, State of Utah, arid have been 
for more than three months immediately next prior to the 
commencement of this action. 
2. That the Plaintiff and the Defendant were 
married on the 29th day of June,. 1974 at Price, Carbon County, 
State of Utah and have been husband and wife since that time* 
3. That there have been four (4) children born as 
the issue of this marriage, namely, CAHESHMEH, a girl, born 
2-24-75; OMEID, a boy, born 12-12-77; CAMELLIA, a girl, born 
2-19-82; and AZITA, a girl, born 6-19-87. 
4. The Court finds that irreconcilable differences 
have developed between these parties and, therefore, finds 
that the Court should grant a divorce in favor of the 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant and in favor of the 
Defendant and against the Plaintiff. 
5. The Court finds that it must first determine 
the issue of custody of the children since the best interests 
of the children will also, of necessity, affect the 
distribution of property and other matters at issue in this 
case. 
6. The Court finds that there has been substantial 
conflict in the evidence and the testimony as presented by 
each party in this matter. The Court finds it extremely 
difficult to make a detenaination of custody of the children 
in this particular case. The Court must, of necessity, make 
its decision based upon its determination of what is in the 
best interests of those children. The Court is familiar with 
the relevant case law and particularly the best interest tests 
as defined in Pusev v. Pusev. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). The 
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Court is also mindful of the numerous other cases which 
outline additional factors which the Court must take into 
consideration in determining what is in the best interests of 
the minor children. Bearing those standards in mind, the Court 
finds as follows: 
A. That both parents have the necessary 
skills to take care of the daily physical needs of the 
children and that neither parent has abused or significantly 
neglected the children in the past. 
B. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has 
been the primary caretaker of the children since their 
respective births until the time of the separation of the 
parties in approximately February of 1988. Plaintiff has 
continued to be the primary caretaker of the three (3) minor 
daughters of the parties since the time of the separation of 
the parties. The Court further finds that the parties' son, 
0MEID, has been in the care and custody of the Defendant for 
a time period following shortly after the separation of the 
parties in February of 1988. 
C. The Court finds that during the course of 
this marriage and up to the present time, the Defendant has 
maintained full time employment with Utah Power and Light and 
also runs and operates a Karate school and studio on a part 
time basis and that he has had little time to devote to the 
every day care and supervision of the children. The Court 
finds that the Plaintiff has not worked during this marriage 
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but has devoted her full time to the care and supervision of 
the children, except that she has recently started a part time 
job that takes her out of the home for approximately 20 hours 
a week. 
D. The Court finds that each these children 
have specialized needs which need to be addressed by the Court 
in arriving at the Court's decision on custody. 
E. The youngest child, AZITA, age 2, has 
never had another care taker except her mother and the Court 
finds that there is a strong bond of love and affection 
between the Plaintiff and this youngest child. When the 
Plaintiff is working her few hours each week, the Plaintiff's 
mother has been providing care for the child and that that 
arrangement is working satisfactorily. The Court finds that 
it is in AZITA'S best interest not to disrupt that strong bond 
of love and affection with the Plaintiff. 
F. The Court finds that CAMELLIA, age 7, has 
several learning disabilities and is enrolled in a special 
education course that requires extra help and supervision 
outside of school and that the Plaintiff has been supplying 
that extra help and supervision. This child is making 
excellent progress in her schooling and training but will need 
continued special help for several hours a day if her progress 
is to continue. The Plaintiff has been supplying this help and 
is in a position to continue devoting the time necessary to 
assist CAMELLIA in her future studies. 
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G. OMEID, the son of these parties, nearly 
age 12, has developed a great amount of animosity toward his 
mother because of her prior activity and expresses a strong 
desire to remain with his father where he has been since the 
temporary order was issued in April of 1989. OMEID is 
progressing well in his schooling, shows no signs of personal 
or social maladjustment, and seems to be happy living with his 
father. Because of the strong animosity that he has developed 
against his mother, it would not be in his best interest to 
force him to live with her at this time. The Court finds that 
it is in OMEID'S best interests that he be allowed to remain 
with his father. 
H. The parties oldest daughter, CARESHMEH, 
age 14 plus, has expressed a strong and determined desire to 
live with her mother and is very emphatic in opposition to 
living with her father. The Court finds that she is well 
adjusted socially, is receiving high grades in her schooling, 
is active in various school and church activities and is happy 
living with her mother. The Court finds that it would not be 
in CARESHMEH'S best interests to force her to live with her 
father at this time. 
I. The Court finds that if the Defendant was 
given custody of the two (2) younger children, he would have 
to employ a daycare provider for substantial periods of time 
and either spend special time with CAMELUCA or employ a tutor 
for her. The activities required by the tutor and a daycare 
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provider are presently being adequately provided for by the 
Plaintiff. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's schedule is 
the more flexible one in meeting the needs of these two (2) 
younger children and particularly the special needs of the 
minor child, CAMELLIA. 
J. The Court particularly finds that it would 
certainly be a detriment to the two (2) younger children to 
remove them from the care and custody of their mother. 
K. The Court finds that there is no doubt 
that the Plaintiff has shown very poor judgment in her 
relationship with a sixteen (16) year old boy named RYAN 
HCGAVIN. Her indiscretions in this regard cannot be tolerated 
and, if they were to continue, could have a detrimental affect 
on the children. These past activities have not had a 
demonstrable effect on the children, except for the boy, 
OMEID. Although there seems to be some factual dispute about 
the matters contained in the family study performed by Dr. 
Smith, the doctor's final recommendation to the Court is 
primarily based on the general unwholesome character of Mr. 
McGavin, and the Plaintiff's continued association with him. 
There is no doubt that Plaintiff's association with Mr. 
McGavin has caused considerable embarrassment to all of the 
family in the community in the past. Dr. Smith also testified 
that with respect to the two (2) younger children of the 
parties, they were of such a young age that they had no 
appreciable understanding of that relationship and therefore 
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had not been detrimentally effected by same. The Plaintiff 
testified that she has had little association with Mr. McGavin 
since the temporary order was entered and that if given 
custody of the children, she would have no association with 
him in the future. Therefore, the Court finds that it is in 
the best interests of the children that the present custodial 
arrangement be continued and that the Plaintiff be awarded the 
custody and control of the three (3) girls and that the 
Defendant be awarded the custody of the parties' son. 
L. The Court further finds that the 
visitation schedule that has been set up in the temporary 
order has been working effectively between the parties and 
that it is in the best interests of the minor children that 
said visitation order become the permanent order of visitation 
in the final Decree of Divorce. 
M. In the best interests of the children, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiff should be ordered not to 
associate with RYAN MCGAVIN at any time. 
7. The Court finds that the Defendant has a gross 
income from his employment at Utah Power and Light of 
approximately FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY ($4#170.00) 
DOLLARS per month and that the Plaintiff has a gross income 
from her part time employment of approximately THREE HUNDRED 
FORTY-FOUR ($344.00) DOLLARS per month. 
8. Although the parties have some income from 
their rental property, the financial statement as submitted 
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by the Defendant shows that there is a negative cash flow on 
this property after payment of the mortgage payments and that 
they have had to supplement this income in order to make the 
payments on the property. The record further shows that the 
Defendant received, for the first eight (8) months of 1989, 
a net income from his karate business in the approximate sum 
of THREE THOUSAND ($3#000.00) DOLLARS when we subtract the 
depreciation that he contained in his schedule. This schedule 
also shows that there may be some duplication of personal 
expenses that he has charged against his business account. The 
net income received from the karate studio has been and will 
be required to make up the negative cash flow on the rental 
property so the Court cannot take this amount into account in 
fixing child support and alimony. 
9. Based upon the Child Support Guideline 
Worksheets and the Financial Statements of the parties, the 
Court finds that the Defendant can reasonably pay and the 
Plaintiff will reasonably need the sum of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-
SIX ($266.00) DOLLARS per month for each of the three (3) 
children in her custody. The Court will not order that the 
Plaintiff pay to the Defendant any sum to contribute to the 
support of their son because of her extremely limited income 
which the Court has taken into consideration in fixing the 
child support awarded herein. 
10. The income statement of the Defendant shows 
that he has a monthly deduction of THREE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE 
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($333.00) DOLLARS per monch to a savings account and 
additionally pays life insurance premiums in the amount of ONE 
HUNDRED SIXTEEN ($116.00) DOLLARS per month. Although the 
Court feels that these deductions are admirable, they should 
not continue if those funds are needed for family necessities. 
The Defendant's financial statement further shows that he pays 
THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE ($325.00) DOLLARS per month for 
rent, but the evidence shows that he is living in one of the 
parties' own apartments. 
11. The Plaintiff's financial statement lists net 
income of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE ($289.00) DOLLARS per month 
and expenses of TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN ($2117.00) 
DOLLARS per month. Her biggest expense is for debt payments 
of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT ($548.00) DOLLARS per month on 
charge accounts that carry a high interest rate. The Plaintiff 
should, and can, make arrangements for reduction of this 
expense by application of other assets or by making other 
arrangements for the payment for those debts. 
12. Based on the relative incomes of the parties, 
the length of the marriage, the ability to pay, and the needs 
of the parties, the Court finds that the Defendant can pay and 
the Plaintiff will reasonably need the sum of SIX HUNDRED 
($600.00) DOLLARS per month by way of alimony, said alimony 
to terminate upon the Defendant's death or upon the 
Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with an adult male who 
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is not a relative. That such alimony award is permanent until 
such time as a material change of circumstances occurs. 
13. The payment of support and alimony shall 
commence with the month of October, 1989, and shall be payable 
at the rate of one-half of said support and alimony on or 
before the 15th of October, 1989 and one-half of said support 
and alimony on or before the last day of October, 1989 and 
that said support and alimony should continue on the same 
schedule for each and every month thereafter. The Court 
further finds that the Temporary Order which is currently in 
effect shall remain in effect through the month of September, 
1989. 
14. The Court finds that the home of the parties, 
together with the adjacent lot, should be placed in the names 
of the parties as tenants in common and that the Plaintiff 
should have the right to the exclusive use of the property for 
herself and the three (3) children in her custody until such 
time as she vacates the property, remarries, or until the 
youngest child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, at 
which time the Court finds that the property should be sold 
and the net equity received from the sale divided equally 
between the parties hereto. Until the home property is sold, 
the Court finds that the Plaintiff should be required to pay 
the taxes and insurance on the property and be responsible to 
take care of necessary repairs and maintenance and keep the 
property in a reasonable state suitable for habitation. 
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15. The Court further finds that all of the other 
real estate property should be placed in the names of the 
parties hereto as tenants in common and that said property 
should be listed for sale and that upon the sale of each of 
the properties the net proceeds therefrom should be divided 
equally between the parties. Until the property is sold, the 
Defendant should be entitled to all of the income from the 
properties and should be obligated to pay all of the mortgage 
payments, taxes and insurance and upkeep on said properties 
and that he should have the exclusive use of same and the 
right to manage same until a sale is obtained for each of said 
properties. In the event the Defendant wishes to keep the 
karate studio, the Court finds that he should be allowed to 
do so provided that he pays to the Plaintiff a sum equal to 
one-half of the current appraised value, said appraised value 
to be determined by two (2) appraisers, one of which is to be 
selected by each of the parties hereto. 
16. The Court finds that there is a conflict in the 
testimony regarding the alleged debt owed to the Defendant's 
father. Since there is no written evidence of the debt, no 
schedule of payments, no due date for the payment of said debt 
and no recorded security interests, the Court finds that it 
is best to order that each of the parties be responsible to 
pay one-half of any debt which may be owed to Plaintiff's 
father when and if that debt is ever established as an actual 
legal obligation. 
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17. The Court finds that the Defendant has 
accumulated Utah Power and Light Stock and/or Pacific Corp. 
Stock during the time these parties have been married. The 
Court further finds that approximately TEN THOUSAND 
($10,000.00) DOLLARS of said stock is encumbered by a loan 
against same which was used in acquiring one of the parties7 
parcel of real estate. The Court finds that it is equitable 
that the Plaintiff receive one-half of the Defendant's 
unencumbered Utah Power and Light and Pacific Corp. Stock and 
that she be responsible to pay any tax on her share of that 
stock when it is withdrawn and delivered to her. The Court 
finds that the Defendant should be awarded his one-half of the 
unencumbered Utah Power and Light and Pacific Corp. Stock and 
all of the encumbered portion of that stock and that the 
Defendant should be required to assume the loan against the 
encumbered portion of that stock and that he should be 
required to pay same and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
The Defendant shall be responsible for any taxes on his share 
of the unencumbered stock when it is withdrawn. The Court 
received substantially conflicting testimony concerning two 
(2) FOURTEEN THOUSAND ($14,000.00) DOLLARS time certificates 
of deposit which are currently in the names of Defendant's 
mother and father. The Court finds that there was not 
sufficient evidence presented to show that those time 
certificates of deposit, as they presently exist, are a 
marital asset or that the parties have any interest in them. 
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18. The Court further finds that all of the 
children's savings accounts should go to the party who has 
custody of that child for the use and benefit of the child. 
19. The Court finds that the IRA account in the 
Desertview Credit Union in the sum of approximately FOUR 
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE ($4,461.00) DOLLARS should be 
awarded to the Plaintiff and that the IRA account at Allstate 
in the sum of approximately FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-
THREE ($5,143.00) DOLLARS should be awarded to the Defendant. 
The Court finds that the parties have an Allstate Insurance 
policy with a cash value of approximately THREE THOUSAND 
($3,000.00) DOLLARS. The Court finds that said policy should 
be exchanged for its cash value and that the proceeds be 
divided equally between the parties hereto forthwith. In the 
event there are any tax consequences which are incurred as a 
result of cashing in the IRA accounts, each party should be 
required to pay one-half of said tax consequences. 
20. The Court finds that there are policies of 
insurance on each of the children and that those policies of 
insurance should be awarded to the parent who has that child 
in his or her custody. The Court finds that if the party with 
custody of that child wishes to continue the policy, then said 
custodial parent should be responsible to pay for any premiums 
on that policy. 
21. The Court finds that the Plaintiff will need 
the use of the 1986 Jeep# 1980 Buick and the 1978 Dodge Van 
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and that the Defendant will need the use of the 1979 Mercedes, 
the 1979 Ford truck, the 1981 Yamaha and the 1983 three-
wheeler. 
22. The Court finds that the Plaintiff will need 
the furniture, fixtures and appliances located in the home of 
the parties, with the exception of the following items which 
the Court finds the Defendant will need: 
A. All of Defendant's personal items and all 
of the furniture and fixtures in the home that were 
exclusively used by Omeid, together with all of Omeid's 
personal effects including the Nintendo. 
B. The Defendant will require the use of his 
office furniture equipment, his tools, his stereo, the Epson 
computer, the non-remote control television set, the camera 
and projector, and the family room set with the fold out queen 
size bed and loveseat. 
C. The Defendant will need all of his 
personal effects and one-third of all of the bedding, linens, 
towels, cooking utensils and cooking hardware so as to allow 
him to set up housekeeping for himself and OMEID. 
D. The Court finds that the Defendant will 
need the shotgun, the 357 Magnum, the two .22 rifles, the 
Court finds that the Plaintiff will need and should be awarded 
the 30 06 rifle and the .22 pistol. 
23. The Court awards to the Defendant the red and 
blue 13 x 9 foot persian carpet and one red and blue 2' x 3' 
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persian carpet. The court finds that the Plaintiff should be 
given the two red persian carpets, each approximately 3' x 6', 
one red and blue persian carpet approximately 3' x 6' and one 
persian carpet that is approximately 2' x 5'. 
24. The Court awards all of the jewelry to the 
Plaintiff that she now has in her possession which consists 
of the diamond ring consisting of two three-quarter carat 
diamonds with small diamonds that were a gift to her as a 
Mother's Day present, which has a value of $4,000.00, the one 
and one-half carat ruby ring, which has a value of 
approximately $1,000.00, and the wedding band with diamonds, 
which has a value of approximately $800.00, and two gold 
chains that are worth approximately $250.00, and three charms 
worth approximately $75.00. 
She is also awarded her wedding ring, which is 
a three-quarter carat diamond with several small diamonds, 
having a value of $4,500.00, and her engagement ring which is 
one-half carat diamond with several small diamonds 
surrounding, which has a value of $1,500.00. These rings were 
gifts to her and are treated as her sole property. 
The Defendant is awarded the jewelry that he 
has in his possession except for the items above that are 
awarded to the Plaintiff, and the gold lion ring that is in 
the possession of the Plaintiff, which has an approximate 
value of $800.00. Some of the items that he has in his 
possession consist of: diamond earrings, which have a value 
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of approximately $2,500.00, gold coin on a thick chain, which 
has a value of approximately $3,000.00, a gold ID bracelet, 
which has a value of approximately $2,000.00, a diamond 
necklace, which has a value of approximately $2,800.00, a gold 
ring with a large red stone having a value of approximately 
$1,500.00, a diamond ring .50 carats, which has a value of 
$1,200.00, nine gold charms, which have a value of 
approximately $2,200.00, a two carat oval diamond ring having 
a value of approximately $4,500.00, two necklaces with 
religious inscription having a value of approximately $800.00, 
and all other miscellaneous gold coins and charms that he now 
has in his possession. 
The Court will order that the parties exchange the 
jewelry items within fifteen (15) days of the date of the 
signing of the Decree. 
25. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be 
required to assume and pay the debts listed on her financial 
statement, to-wit: 
Visa $2200.00 
Mastercard $1700.00 
ZCMI $ 243.28 
Nordstrom $ 880.00 
Weinstock $ 750.00 
Sears $1000.00 
Discover $1400.00 
Visa $1300.00 
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J C Penney $ 250.00 
Mervins $ 350.00 
The Defendant should be ordered to assume and pay 
all other family debts not specifically provided for herein. 
26. The Court further finds that it is equitable 
that each of the parties be awarded one-half of any of 
Defendant's retirement benefits which exist separate and apart 
from the stock which has been acquired by the parties. The 
Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to one-half of said 
retirement benefits which were accumulated during the period 
of this marriage and finds and directs that an appropriate 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order be entered dividing 
Defendant's retirement benefit, if same exists. 
27. The Court further orders that the Defendant 
assist the Plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and 
benefits if the Plaintiff desires those benefits, provided 
that Plaintiff pay the necessary premium payment that would 
be required in order to obtain same. 
28. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has 
indicated to the Court that she will voluntarily execute tax 
documents allocating the children's tax dependency as the 
Court deems just and equitable. Based upon that voluntary 
agreement by the Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Plaintiff 
should be required to sign such documents as may be necessary 
to allow the Defendant to claim the three (3) children in 
Plaintiff's custody as Defendant's tax exemptions on his 
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income tax returns and that he should be allowed to continue 
this claim deduction until such time as the Plaintiff may 
obtain full time employment. In the event that Plaintiff 
obtains full time employment, the Court directs that the 
Plaintiff should be allowed to claim the two (2) youngest 
children as her dependents on her income tax returns and that 
the Defendant should be allowed to claim the two (2) oldest 
children as his dependents on his income tax returns. In the 
event that the Plaintiff is not willing to sign the necessary 
documents, as indicated herein, the Court will, upon petition 
by the Defendant, reconsider the amount of alimony that the 
Court has ordered him to pay under this decision. 
29. The Court finds that each party should be 
ordered to maintain all available medical, dental and/or 
optical insurance for the minor children if such insurance is 
available to the party as a benefit of their employment. Each 
party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonable and 
necessary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred on 
behalf of the minor children which are not covered by a policy 
of insurance. 
30. The Court finds that the Defendant has some 
prepaid legal insurance benefits available through his 
employment that will pay benefits of approximately ONE 
THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS per party. The Court finds that 
it is equitable that the parties equally divide any funds that 
may be available to them under Defendant's legal insurance 
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plan to assist the parties for payment of their Court costs 
and attorneys' fees in this matter. After equal application 
of the insurance proceeds, each of the parties should be 
required to assume and pay the balance of their own Court 
costs and attorneys' fees. 
31. The Plaintiff should be entitled to an Order 
to Withhold and Deliver pursuant to State law to be held in 
the file in the event that the Defendant should become more 
than thirty (30) days past due in his child support. 
The Court having entered the foregoing Findings of 
Fact now concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Jurisdiction is proper before this Court. 
2. That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from 
the Defendant and the Defendant is granted a divorce from the 
Plaintiff. 
3. That the Plaintiff is awarded the custody of 
the minor daughters of the parties, namely, CARESHMEH, 
CAMELLIA and AZITA. That the Defendant is awarded the custody 
of the parties minor son, OMEID. That each party shall have 
the right to reasonable visitation with the children in the 
other parties' custody, including but not limited to, the 
following visitation rights: 
A. That ^  the non-custodial parent shall be 
allowed to visit with the children in the custody of the other 
parent at all reasonable times and that the Defendant be 
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allowed to take the children every other weekend from 10:00 
a.m. on Saturday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The Plaintiff 
shall be allowed to take OHEID every other weekend from 
Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 
B. The Court further orders that the children 
shall be allowed to go to their karate lessons with the 
Defendant jlf the particular child wishes to do so. 
4. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sura of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX ($266.00) DOLLARS 
per month for each of the three (3) children in Plaintiff's 
custody, commencing with the month of October, 1989 • Said 
child support shall be payable at the rate of one-half of said 
support on or before the 15th of the month and one-half of 
said support on or before the last day of the month and said 
support shall continue on the same schedule each and every 
month thereafter. 
5. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of SIX HUNDRED ($600.00) DOLLARS per month 
for and as alimony, commencing with the month of October, 
1989. Said alimony shall be payable at the rate of one-half 
of said sum on or before the 15th of the month and one-half 
of said sum on or before the last day of the month, said 
alimony to terminate upon the Defendant's death or upon the 
Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with an adult male who 
is not a relative. That such alimony award is permanent until 
such time as a material change of circumstances occurs. 
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6. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
real and personal property during this marriage and said 
property is awarded as follows: 
A. The home of the parties, together with the 
adjacent lot, is to be placed in the names of the parties as 
tenants-in-common. The Plaintiff shall have the right to the 
exclusive use of said property for herself and the three (3) 
minor children in her custody until such time as she vacates 
the property, remarries, or until the youngest child in her 
care and custody reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, at 
which time the Court orders that the property be sold and the 
net equity received from the sale divided equally between the 
parties hereto. Until the home property is sold, the Court 
orders that the Plaintiff be required to pay the taxes and 
insurance on said property and be responsible to take care of 
the necessary repairs and maintenance and keep the property 
in a reasonable state suitable for habitation. 
B. All of the other real estates properties 
owned by these parties shall be placed in the names of the 
parties hereto as tenants-in-common and each of said 
properties shall be immediately listed for sale and upon the 
sale of each of said properties, the net proceeds therefrom 
shall be divided equally between the parties. Until said 
properties are sold, the Defendant shall be entitled to all 
of the income from the properties and shall be obligated to 
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pay all of the mortgage payments, taxes, insurance and upkeep 
on said properties and he shall have the exclusive use of same 
and the right to manage same until a sale is obtained for each 
of said properties. In the event that the Defendant wishes to 
keep the karate studio, the Court orders that he should be 
allowed to do so provided that he immediately pays to the 
Plaintiff a sum equal to one-half of the current appraised 
value, said appraised value to be determined by two (2) 
appraisers, one (1) on which is to be selected by each of the 
parties hereto. 
C. Each party is ordered to be responsible 
to pay one-half of any debt which may be owed to Plaintiff's 
father when and if that debt is ever established as an actual 
legal obligation. 
D. With respect to Defendant's Utah Power and 
Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts, said accounts are awarded 
as follows: 
1. The Defendant is awarded that portion 
of the stock which is encumbered by a loan in the sum of 
approximately TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS, provided that 
the Defendant assume and pays the outstanding encumbrance 
thereon and holds the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of 
all unencumbered stock which Defendant may have in said Utah 
Power and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts. 
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3, The Defendant is awarded one-half of 
the unencumbered stock which he may have in said Utah Power 
and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts• 
4. Plaintiff shall be responsible to pay 
any tax on her share of that stock when it is withdrawn and 
delivered to her and the Defendant shall be required to assume 
and pay any taxes on his share of the unencumbered stock when 
same is withdrawn and delivered to him. 
E. The childrens' savings accounts are 
awarded to the party who has custody of the child to be used 
for the use and benefit of the child. 
F. The Plaintiff is awarded the Desertview 
credit union account in the sum of approximately FOUR THOUSAND 
FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE ($4,461.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is 
awarded the IRA account at Allstate in the sum of 
approximately FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE 
($5,143.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is ordered to immediately 
cash in the Allstate insurance policy and obtain the cash 
value of same and deliver one-half of said amount, together 
with verification of said amount, to the Plaintiff forthwith. 
That any tax consequences associated with cashing the IRAs 
should be divided equally between the parties. 
G. With respect to the life insurance 
policies on the lives of the minor children, those policies 
are awarded to the parent who has that child in his or her 
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custody. If that custodial parent wishes to continue the 
policy, then said custodial parent shall be responsible to pay 
for any premiums on the childrens' policies, 
H. The Plaintiff is awarded the 1986 Jeep, 
the 1980 Buick and the 1978 Dodge Van, free and clear of all 
claims of the Defendant. The Defendant is awarded the 1979 
Mercedes, the 1979 Ford truck, the 1981 Yamaha and the 1983 
three wheeler, free and clear of all claims of the Plaintiff. 
I. The Plaintiff is awarded the furniture, 
fixtures and appliances located in the home of the parties, 
with the exception of the following items which the Court 
awards to the Defendant: 
1. All of Defendant's personal items and 
the furniture and fixtures in the home that were exclusively 
used by Omeid, together with all of Omeid's personal effects 
including the Nintendo. 
2. The Defendant is awarded his office 
furniture equipment, his tools, his stereo, the Epson 
computer, the non-remote control television set, the camera 
and projector, the family room set with the fold out queen 
size bed and love seat. 
3. The Defendant is awarded one-third 
of all bedding, linens, towels, cooking utensils and cooking 
hardware. 
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4. The Defendant is awarded the shotgun, 
the 357 Magnum, and the two .22 Rifles. The Plaintiff is 
awarded the 30 06 Rifle and the .22 pistol. 
5. The Defendant is awarded the red and 
blue 13' x 9' persian carpet and one red and blue 2' x 3' 
persian carpet. The Plaintiff is awarded the two red persian 
carpets, each approximately 3' x 6', one red and blue persian 
carpet approximately 3' x 6' and one persian carpet that is 
approximately 2' x 5'. 
6. The Court awards all of the jewelry 
to the Plaintiff that she now has in her possession which 
consists of the diamond ring consisting of two three-quarter 
carat diamonds with small diamonds that were a gift to her as 
a Mother's Day present, which has a value of $4,000.00, the 
one and one-half carat ruby ring, which has a value of 
approximately $1,000.00, and the wedding band with diamonds, 
which has a value of approximately $800.00, and two gold 
chains that are worth approximately $250.00, and three charms 
worth approximately $75.00. 
She is also awarded her wedding ring, which is 
a three-quarter carat diamond with several small diamonds, 
having a value of $4,500.00, and her engagement ring which is 
one-half carat diamond with several small diamonds 
surrounding, which has a value of $1,500.00. These rings were 
gifts to her and are treated as her sole property. 
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The Defendant is awarded the jewelry that he 
has in his possession except for the items above that are 
awarded to the Plaintiff, and the gold lion ring that is in 
the possession of the Plaintiff, which has an approximate 
value of $800.00. Some of the items that he has in his 
possession consist of: diamond earrings, which have a value 
of approximately $2,500.00, gold coin on a thick chain, which 
has a value of approximately $3,000.00, a gold ID bracelet, 
which has a value of approximately $2,000.00, a diamond 
necklace, which has a value of approximately $2,800.00, a gold 
ring with a large red stone having a value of approximately 
$1,500.00, a diamond ring .50 carats, which has a value of 
$1,200.00, nine gold charms, which have a value of 
approximately $2,200.00, a two carat oval diamond ring having 
a value of approximately $4,500.00, two necklaces with 
religious inscription having a value of approximately $800.00, 
and all other miscellaneous gold coins and charms that he now 
has in his possession. 
The Court will- order that the parties exchange the 
jewelry items within fifteen (15) days of the date of the 
signing of the Decree. 
7. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
debts and obligations and said debts and obligations are 
allocated as follows: 
A* The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay 
the following: 
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Visa 
Mastercard 
ZCMI 
Nordstrom 
Weinstock 
Sears 
Discover 
Visa 
J C Penney 
Mervins 
$2200.00 
$1700.00 
$ 243.28 
$ 880.00 
$ 750.00 
$1000.00 
$1400.00 
$1300.00 
$ 250.00 
$ 350.00 
B. The Defendant is ordered to assume and pay 
all other family debts not specifically provided for herein. 
8. The Defendant may have accumulated some 
retirement benefits with Utah Power & Light which exist 
separate and apart from the stock account which the parties 
have acquired. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of any such 
retirement benefits which may exist and which have been 
accumulated during the period of the marriage and the Court 
orders that an appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
be entered dividing any such retirement benefits which may 
have been accumulated with Utah Power and Light equally 
between each of the parties hereto. 
9. The Court orders that the Defendant assist the 
Plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and benefits if 
the Plaintiff desires those benefits, provided that Plaintiff 
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pay the necessary premium payment that would be required in 
order to obtain same. 
10. The Court finds that each party should be 
ordered to maintain all available medical, dental and/or 
optical insurance for the minor children if such insurance is 
available to the party as a benefit of their employment. Each 
party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonable and 
necessary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred on 
behalf of the minor children which are not covered by a policy 
of insurance. 
11. Based upon the Plaintiff's voluntarily 
agreement, expressed in Open Court, the Court orders that the 
Plaintiff sign such documents as may be necessary to allow the 
Defendant to claim the three (3) minor children in Plaintiff's 
custody as Defendant's tax exemptions on his income tax 
returns and that Defendant be allowed to continue to claim 
said deductions until such time as the Plaintiff has obtained 
full time employment. In the event the Plaintiff obtains full 
time employment, then the Court orders that the Plaintiff be 
allowed to claim the two youngest children as her dependents 
on her income tax returns and that the Defendant be allowed 
to claim the two oldest children as his tax dependents on his 
income tax returns. In the event that the Plaintiff is not 
willing to sign the necessary documents, as voluntarily agreed 
herein, the Court will, upon petition by the Defendant, 
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reconsider the amount of alimony that the Court has ordered 
herein. 
12. The Court orders that Defendant's legal 
insurance benefits available through his employment are to be 
divided equally between the parties hereto. After equal 
application of the insurance proceeds, each party is ordered 
to assume and pay the balance of their respective Court costs 
and attorney fees. 
13. The Plaintiff is entitled to an Order to 
Withhold and Deliver pursuant to State law to be held in the 
file in the event that the Defendant should become more than 
thirty (30) days past due in his child support. 
14. That the Plaintiff is ordered not to associate 
with RYAN MCGAVIN at any time^ 
DATED this / £/ day of January, 1990. 
-*- CW si / 
BOYD BUNNELL • 
D i s t r i c t Court . J u d g e 
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JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza, Suite 1 
475 East Main 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAUNA LEE TIZPA, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
Vs. ; 
AKBAR TIZPA, 
Defendant. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
i Civil No. 15776 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
trial before the Court on the 14th and 15th days of September, 
1989, the Honorable BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge, presiding; 
and the Plaintiff having appeared personally and with her 
counsel, JOANE PAPPAS WHITE; and, the Defendant having 
appeared personally and with his counsel, SHARON DONOVAN; and, 
the Court having heard sworn testimony and having received 
exhibits for and on behalf of each of the parties and having 
taken this matter under advisement and having entered the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now, 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
L...iJ 
*f«M I U 4WWU 
1. That the Plaintiff is granted a divorce from 
the Defendant and u*e Defendant is granted a divorce from the 
Plaintiff. 
2. That the Plaintiff is awarded the custody of 
the minor daughters of the parties, namely, CARESHMEH, 
CAMELLIA and AZITA. That the Defendant is awarded the custody 
of the parties minor son, OMEID. That each party shall have 
the right to reasonable visitation with the children in the 
other parties' custody, including but not limited to, the 
following visitation rights: 
A. That the non-custodial parent shall be 
allowed to visit with the children in the custody of the other 
parent at all reasonable times and that the Defendant be 
allowed to take the children every other weekend from 10:00 
a.m. on Saturday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. The Plaintiff 
shall be allowed to take OMEID every other weekend from 
Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.it 
B. The Court further orders that the children 
shall be allowed to go to their karate lessons with the 
Defendant if the particular child wishes to do so. 
3. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX ($266.00) DOLLARS 
ner month for each of the three (3) children in Plaintiff's 
stody, commenci* .Fith the month of October, 1989. Said 
child support shal^ . J payable at the rate of one-half of said 
support on or before the 15th of the month and one-half ui 
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said support on or before the last day of the month and said 
support shall continue on the same schedule each and every 
month thereafter. 
4. That the Defendant is ordered to pay to the 
Plaintiff the sum of SIX HUNDRED ($600.00) DOLLARS per month 
for and as alimony, commencing with the month of October, 
1989. Said alimony shall be payable at the rate of one-half 
of said sum on or before the 15th of the month and one-half 
of said sum on or before the last day of the month, said 
alimony to terminate upon the Defendant's death or upon the 
Plaintiff's remarriage or cohabitation with an adult male who 
is not a relative.. That such alimony award is permanent until 
such time as a material change of circumstances occurs. 
5. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
real and personal property during this marriage and said 
property is awarded as follows: 
A. The home of the parties, together with the 
adjacent lot, is to be placed in the names of the parties as 
tenants in common. The Plaintiff shall have the right to the 
exclusive use of said property for herself and the three (3) 
minor children in her custody until such time as she vacates 
the property, remarries, or until the youngest child in her 
care and custody reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, at 
which time the Court orders that the property be sold and the 
net equity received from the sale divided equally between the 
parties hereto. Until the home property is sold, the Court 
orders that the Plaintiff be required to pay the taxes and 
insurance on said property and be responsible to take care of 
the necessary repairs and maintenance and keep the property 
in a reasonable state suitable for habitation. 
B. All of the other real estates properties 
owned by these parties shall be placed in the names of the 
parties hereto as tenants in common and each of said 
properties shall be immediately listed for sale and upon the 
sale of each of said properties, the net proceeds therefrom 
shall be divided equally between the parties. Until said 
properties are sold, the Defendant shall be entitled to all 
of the income from the properties and shall be obligated to 
pay all of the mortgage payments, taxes, insurance and upkeep 
on said properties and he shall have the exclusive use of same 
and the right to manage same until a sale is obtained for each 
of said properties. In the event that the Defendant wishes to 
keep the karate studio, the Court orders that he should be 
allowed to do so provided that he immediately pays to the 
Plaintiff a sum equal to one-half of the current appraised 
value, said appraised value to be determined by two (2) 
appraisers, one (1) on which is to be selected by each of the 
parties hereto. 
C. Each party is ordered to be responsible 
to pay one-half of any debt which may be ov/ed to Plaintiff's 
father when and if that debt is ever established as an actual 
legal obligation. 
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D. With respect to Defendant's Utah Power and 
Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts, said accounts are awarded 
as follows: 
1. The Defendant is awarded that portion 
of the stock which is encumbered by a loan in the sum of 
approximately TEN THOUSAND ($10,000.00) DOLLARS, provided that 
the Defendant assume and pays the outstanding encumbrance 
thereon and holds the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
2. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of 
all unencumbered stock which Defendant may have in said Utah 
Power and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts. 
3. The Defendant is awarded one-half of 
the unencumbered stock which he may have in said Utah Power 
and Light-Pacific Corp stock accounts. 
4. Plaintiff shall be responsible to pay 
any tax on her share of that stock when it is withdrawn and 
delivered to her and the Defendant shall be required to assume 
and pay any taxes on his share of the unencumbered stock when 
same is withdrawn and delivered to him. 
E. The childrens' savings accounts are 
awarded to the party who has custody of the child to be used 
for the use and benefit of the child. 
F. The Plaintiff is awarded the Desertview 
credit uniop account in the sum of approximately FOUR THOUSAND 
FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE ($4,461.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is 
awarded the IRA account at Allstate in the sum of 
approximately FIVE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE 
($5,143.00) DOLLARS; the Defendant is ordered to immediately 
cash in the Allstate insurance policy and obtain the cash 
value of same and deliver one-half of said amount, together 
with verification of said amount, to the Plaintiff forthwith. 
That any tax consequences associated with cashing the IRAs 
should be divided equally between the parties. 
G. With respect to the life insurance 
policies on the lives of the minor children, those policies 
are awarded to the parent who has that child in his or her 
custody. If that custodial parent wishes to continue the 
policy# then said custodial parent shall be responsible to pay 
for any premiums on the childrens' policies. 
H. The Plaintiff is awarded the 1986 Jeep, 
the 1980 Buick and the 1978 Dodge Vanf free and clear of all 
claims of the Defendant. The Defendant is awarded the 1979 
Mercedes, the 1979 Ford truck, the 1981 Yamaha and the 198 3 
three wheeler, free and clear of all claims of the Plaintiff. 
I. The Plaintiff is awarded the furniture, 
fixtures and appliances located in the home of the parties, 
with the exception of the following items which the Court 
awards to the Defendant: 
1. All of Defendants personal items and 
the furniture and fixtures in the home that were exclusively 
used by Omeid, together with all of Omeid's personal effects 
including the Nintendo. 
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2. The Defendant is awarded his office 
furniture equipment, his tools, his stereo, the Epson 
computer, the non-remote control television set, the camera 
and projector, the family room set with the fold out queen 
size bed and love seat. 
3. The Defendant is awarded one-third 
of all bedding, linens, towels, cooking utensils and cooking 
hardware. 
4. The Defendant is awarded the shotgun, 
the 357 Magnum, and the two .22 Rifles. The Plaintiff is 
awarded the 30 06 Rifle and the .22 pistol. 
5. The Defendant is awarded the red and 
blue 13' x 9' persian carpet and one red and blue 2' x 3' 
persian carpet. The Plaintiff is awarded the two red persian 
carpets, each approximately 3' x 6', one red and blue persian 
carpet approximately 3' x 6' and one persian carpet that is 
approximately 2' x 5'. 
6. The Court awards all of the jewelry 
to the Plaintiff that she now has in her possession which 
consists of the diamond ring consisting of two three-quarter 
carat diamonds with small diamonds that were a gift to her as 
a Mother's Day present, which has a value of $4,000.00, the 
one and one-half carat ruby ring, which has a value of 
approximately $1,000.00, and the wedding band with diamonds, 
which has a value of approximately $800.00, and two gold 
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chains that are worth approximately $250.00, and three charms 
worth approximately $75.00. 
She is also awarded her wedding ring, which is 
a three-quarter carat diamond with several small diamonds, 
having a value of $4,500.00, and her engagement ring which is 
one-half carat diamond with several small diamonds 
surrounding, which has a value of $1,500.00. These rings were 
gifts to her and are treated as her sole property. 
The Defendant is awarded the jewelry that he 
has in his possession except for the items above that are 
awarded to the Plaintiff, and the gold lion ring that is in 
the possession of the nlaintiff, which has an approximate 
value of $800.00. Some of the items that he has in his 
possession consist of: diamond earrings, which have a value 
of approximately $2,500.00, gold coin on a thick chain, which 
has a value of approximately $3,000.00, a gold ID bracelet, 
which has a value of approximately $2,000.00, a diamond 
necklace, which has a value of approximately $2,800.00, a gold 
ring with a large red stone having a value of approximately 
$1,500.00, a diamond ring .50 carats, which has a value of 
$1,200.00, nine gold charms, which have a value of 
approximately $2,200.00, a two carat oval diamond ring having 
a value of approximately $4,500.00, two necklaces with 
religious inscription having a value of approximately $800.00, 
and all other miscellaneous gold coins and charms that he now 
has in his possession. 
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The Court will order that the parties exchange the 
jewelry items within fifteen (15) days of the date of the 
signing of the Decree. 
7. The parties hereto have accumulated certain 
debts and obligations and said debts and obligations are 
allocated as follows: 
A. The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay 
the following: 
Visa $2200.00 
Mastercard $1700.00 
ZCMI $ 243.28 
Nordstrom $ 880.00 
Weinstock $ 750.00 
Sears $1000.00 
Discover $1400.00 
Visa $1300.00 
J C Penney $ 250.00 
Mervins $ 350.00 
B. The Defendant is ordered to assume and pay 
all other family debts not specifically provided for herein. 
8. The Defendant may have accumulated some 
retirement benefits with Utah Power & Light which exist 
separate and apart from the stock account which the parties 
have acquired. The Plaintiff is awarded one-half of any such 
retirement benefits which may exist and which have been 
accumulated during the period of the marriage and the Court 
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orders that an appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
be entered dividing any such retirement benefits which may 
have been accumulated with Utah Power and Light equally 
between each of the parties hereto. 
9. The Court orders that the Defendant assist the 
Plaintiff in obtaining COBRA insurance rights and benefits if 
the Plaintiff desires those benefits, provided that Plaintiff 
pay the necessary premium payment that would be required in 
order to obtain same. 
10. Based upon the Plaintiff's voluntarily 
agreement, expressed in Open Court, the Court orders that the 
Plaintiff sign such documents as may be necessary to allow the 
Defendant to claim the three (3) minor children in Plaintiff's 
custody as Defendant's tax exemptions on his income tax 
returns and that Defendant be allowed to continue to claim 
said deductions until such time as the Plaintiff has obtained 
full time employment. In the event the Plaintiff obtains full 
time employment, then the Court orders that the Plaintiff be 
allowed to claim the two youngest children as her dependents 
on her income tax returns and that the Defendant be allowed 
to claim the two oldest children as his tax dependents on his 
income tax returns. In the event that the Plaintiff is not 
willing to sign the necessary documents, as voluntarily agreed 
herein, the Court will, upon petition by the Defendant, 
reconsider the amount of alimony that the Court has ordered 
herein. 
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11. The Court finds that each party shall be 
ordered to maintain all available medical, dental and/or 
optical insurance for the minor children if such insurance 
is available to the party as a benefit of their employment. 
Each party is ordered to pay one-half of all reasonable and 
necessary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred on 
behalf of the minor children which are not covered by a policy 
of insurance. 
12. The Court orders that Defendant's legal 
insurance benefits available through his employment are to be 
divided equally between the parties hereto. After equal 
application of the insurance proceeds, each party is ordered 
to assume and pay the balance of their respective Court costs 
and attorney fees. 
13. The Plaintiff is entitled to an Order to 
Withhold and Deliver pursuant to State law to be held in the 
file in the event that the Defendant should become more than 
thirty (30) days past due in his child support. 
14. That the Plaintiff is ordered not to associate 
with RYAN MCGAVIN at any time. 
DATED this /f/ - day of January, 1990. 
ADDENDUM MCW 
Order on Order to Show Cause 
JOANE PAPPAS WHITE #3445 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Fifth Street Plaza 
475 East Main - Suite 1 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (801) 637-0177 
Srvr?;7i: r.I57n'C7 COURT 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAUNA LEE TIZPA, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Vs. ; 
AKBAR TIZPA, 
Defendant. ' 
i ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
i Civil No. 15776 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the Court on the 30th day of March, 1989f the Honorable 
Boyd Bunnell, District Judge, presiding; and, the Plaintiff 
having appeared personally and with her counsel, JOANE PAPPAS 
WHITE; and, the Defendant having appeared personally and with 
his counsel, SHARON DONOVAN; and, the Court having heard sworn 
testimony, received exhibits and having taken the matter under 
advisement and having entered a Written Memorandum Decision 
dated March 31, 1989; and the Court having found that the 
Plaintiff has never worked outside of the home and has been 
the primary caretaker of the children of the parties throughout 
the marriage and having found that the Defendant works full 
time and operates a Karate school in the evenings; and, the 
Court having further found that there is a strong bond of af-
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fection between the Plaintiff and the children except for the 
boy, OMEID; and, the Court having found that the Plaintiff's 
indiscretion in being involved with a sixteen (16) year old 
boy has caused OMEID to develope a certain amount of animosity 
against his mother; and having found that said condition may 
be somewhat nutured by statements and actions of the Defendant; 
and having been fully advised in the premises now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That it is in the best interests of the three 
(3) minor daughters of the parties that they remain with their 
mother and, therefore, the temporary custody of the three (3) 
minor girls of this marriage is awarded to their mother, the 
Plaintiff herein. The Court finds that it is in the best interest 
of the minor son of the parties that he remain in the temporary 
custody of the Defendant during the pendency of this action 
and, therefore, the Defendant is awarded the temporary custody 
of the minor son, OMEID. 
2. It is ordered that the Plaintiff not associate 
with RYAN McGAVIN at any time when the children are present 
and, further, that the Plaintiff not allow Mr. McGavin to be 
in the parties home at any time and, further, that the Plaintiff 
not supply him with money or presents. 
3. . The Court further orders that the non-cusvodial 
parent shall be allowed to visit with the children in the custody 
of the other parent at all reasonable times and that the DoiVndant 
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be allowed to take the children every other weekend from 10:00 
a.m. on Saturday until 6:00 p.m. on Sunday commencing with the 
weekend of April 8r 1989. The Plaintiff will be allowed to 
take OMEID every other weekend from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until 
Sunday at 6:00 p.m. commencing with the weekend of April 15f 
1989. 
4. The Court further orders that the children shall 
be allowed to go to their karate lessons with the Defendant 
if the particular child wishes to do so. 
5. The Court orders that each party be restrained 
from threatening, harassing, or interfering with the other, 
or from malcing any derogatory statements about the other in 
the presence of the childrenr and each party is restrained from 
incurring any further debt or from disposing of any marital 
assets. 
6. The Court finds that the Defendant has a gross 
income from his salary at Utah Power and Light of approximately 
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY ($4,170.00) DOLLARS per month 
and that he has other income from his Karate School that is 
used to pay mortgage payments on the real property investments 
made by the parties; therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant 
can pay and the Plaintiff will reasonably need, to assist her 
with the support of the three (3) children, the total sum of 
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE ($775.00) DOLLARS and that she will 
further need temporary .alimony in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED 
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($500.00) DOLLARS per month. It is ordered that the Defendant 
pay said sums to the Plaintiff in semi-monthly installments, 
one-half of said total being due on or before the 15th day of 
April, 1989 and the other half on or before the last day of 
April, 1989 and that said payments continue in this manner until 
further order of this Court. 
7. The Court awards the Plaintiff the exclusive 
use of the parties residence for herself and the three (3) 
children in her care and further grants her the use of the 1986 
Jeep Cherokee automobile. The Defendant is ordered to place 
the Buick automobile in good running condition and to allow 
the Plaintiff to have the use of that vehicle as well. 
8. The Court orders that the Plaintiff have the 
exclusive use of the furniture and fixtures located in the home 
except that the Defendant will be allowed to take his VCR, his 
files and tools, his waterbed, OMEID'S Nintendo games and tapes 
and stereo, and the Defendant will be allowed to keep the tele-
vision and computer that he now has in his possession. The 
Defendant shall be allowed the use of the Mercedes automobile 
during the pendency of this action. 
9. The Plaintiff is ordered to make payments on 
the debts listed on her Financial Statement and hold the Defendant 
harmless therefrom. The Defendant is ordered to make the mortgage 
payments on the investment properties belonging to the parties. 
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10. The Plaintiff has no funds from which to pay 
attorney's fees and, therefore, the Court orders that the 
Defendant pay to the Plaintiff for the use and benefit of her 
attorney, the sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY ($250.00) DOLLARS and 
that said payment be made on or before May 15, 1989. The Court 
further orders that the parties divide any money available to 
them by way of legal fee insurance benefits equally. 
11. The Court finds that neither of the parties hereto 
have a legal obligation to support the Plaintiff's neice who 
is currently residing with the Plaintiff and the child support 
and alimony awarded herein do not consider any money spent for 
the support of the Plaintiff's neice. 
12. The Court hereby appoints Dr. Grant B. Smith 
to perform psychological evaluations on the parties and the 
children and to conduct a home study and to make his findings 
available to the Court and counsel. 
DATED this <^%^day of April, 1989. 
JUNNEL 
:rict Court Judfre 
APPROVED AS TO FORM & CONTENT: 
SHARON DONOVAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
